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Abstract:  Confidentiality,  integrity  and  availability  (C-I-A)  are  the  security  requirements  fundamental  to  any 
computer system.  Similarly, the hardware, software and data are important critical assets. These two components of a 
computer  security  framework  are  entwined;  such  that  a  compromise  in  the  C-I-A  requirements  may  lead  to  a 
compromise  of  the  critical  assets.  The  C-I-A  requirements  and  the  critical  assets  of  a  computer  system  are  well 
researched areas; however they may be insufficient to define the needs of a summative e-assessment system. In this 
paper, we do not discard the existing components; rather we propose security requirements and related components that 




Assessment  is  one  of  the  key  activities  in  student  learning.  Influenced  by  technological  advances, 
assessment has begun to make its way out of the traditional classroom into online environments. Thus, employing 
online  assessments  delivers  benefits  such  as  opportunities  for  lifelong  learning,  on-demand  learning,  automatic 
marking and immediate feedback. Online formative assessments are designed to improve students’ learning and give 
information  about  their  progress  (Rosbottom,  1997).Online  summative  assessment  is  categorised  as  high-stake 
examinations  which  takes  place  at  the  end  of  a  course  of  study  (Rovai,  2000).  In  higher  education,  security 
considerations do not feature prominently; however this changes when an online assessment is considered (Furnell, 
1998). For online formative assessment, issues relating to security are less important as the priority is for students to 
expand  knowledge  (Challis,  2005).  However,  online  summative  assessments  are  perceived  to  be  plagued  with 
security challenges which militate against its effective implementation. In this paper, we focus on defining specific 
security requirements and security attacks in online summative assessments.  
 
2 Existing System Critical Assets, Security Requirements and Threats 
 
Security is a fundamental concept which is relevant in our daily lives and a top priority in several applications.  
Computer systems require specific security requirements which are fundamental to any system. In literature, the 
three basic requirements are confidentiality, integrity, and availability (Stallings, 2000; Gollman, 2006). A security 
relationship exists between the C-I-A requirements and the critical assets (hardware, software and data) of these 
systems (Pfleeger & Pfleeger, 2003). For example, we assume information data (critical asset) in a computer system. 
Thus, the data is expected  
a.  To be accessed by only authorised parties; thus, data must be restricted (confidentiality requirement). 
b.  To contain no alterations of the original data; modification should be done by authorised parties only 
(integrity requirement). 
c.  To  be  operational  and  accessible  whenever  it  is  needed;  except  during  authorised  downtimes 
(availability requirement). 
From  the  above  example,  we  observe  that,  the  C-I-A  security  requirements  may  be  employed  for 
summative e-assessment data, such as item bank and assessment data. In a similar approach, the operations of the C-
I-A requirements  may be applicable to the hardware and software needs of a summative e-assessment system. 
Examples  may  include  the  assessment  engine  and  authoring  tools.  A  security  threat  launched  at  the  security 
requirements may cause potential harm to the critical assets of a system. If the security threats are not evaluated and 
understood;  these  threats  may  compromise  the  confidentiality,  integrity  and  availability  of  the  critical  assets 
(Sandhu, 2002). Thus, existing security threats may be categorised into three broad classes and they describe the 
forms of attacks launched on a computer  system (Stallings, 2000). This threats  include interception (attack on 
confidentiality), interruption (attack on availability), and modification (attack on integrity). 
In this paper, we propose that the critical assets of a summative e-assessment system go beyond the hardware, 
software and data needs; similarly, the security requirements and security threats. However, we do not discard the operations  of  the  existing  security  components;  rather  we  define  security  components  which  are  specific  to 
summative e-assessment systems. 
 
3 Electronic Assessment Security 
According to Marais et al (2006) there are two categories of security in e-assessments:  web security and e-
assessment security. However, they conclude that web security is a well investigated area but it is insufficient to 
fulfil the security needs of e-assessment. Generally, during an assessment, it is expected that a potential learner will 
be present for a test, identified correctly, authenticated genuinely, write a test (delivered through the system), and 
submit  answers  to  the  test.  Thus,  we  propose  that  the  learner  taking  a  test  is  a  valuable  (critical)  asset  of  a 
summative e-assessment system. It may be irrelevant for an assessment system to deliver a test with no entity to take 
the test. In existing computer systems, if a critical asset is compromised; it is perceived that the system has failed to 
satisfy all of its requirements. Thus, we conclude that the summative e-assessment system will be required to define 
security requirements which will be suitable for the learner (valuable asset). 
 
3.1 Defining E-assessment Security Requirements 
The learner is proposed as a valuable asset to the summative e-assessment system; because if there is no entity 
at the assessment site taking the test, then the system is perceived idle. Thus, during a summative e-assessment, 
there are specific requirements which the system expects from a learner. Generally, it is expected that (1) a learner 
should be present for an online test. (2) a learner should be identified correctly (3) a learner should be authenticated 
genuinely and (4) a learner should write a test and submit answers to the test. We propose four security requirements 
expected of the leaner in a summative e-assessment system: presence, identity, authenticity and electronic integrity. 
In the context of this paper, the proposed security requirements are defined. 
a.  Presence: requires the physical and online existence of a learner from the beginning  to the end of an 
assessment. Only authorised learners are required to be present continually for the duration of the test. 
b.  Identity: requires that the learner produce a unique characteristic  which distinguishes  the learner  from 
duplicates or misrepresentation.  
c.  Authenticity: requires that the learner provides a proof/evidence/confirmation of genuineness. Only the 
proof of a learner’s uniqueness is required and not a counterfeit. 
d.  Electronic integrity: requires the single submission of a learner’s answers to an online test.  
3.2 Defining E-assessment Security Threats 
A security threat launched at the security requirements may cause potential harm to the critical assets of a 
system.  Thus,  security  threats  may  compromise  the  security  requirements  of  the  critical  assets.  In  electronic 
assessment security, the security threats which compromise the security requirements are divided into four classes. 
They include 
a.  Impersonation:  this  occurs  when  an  unauthorised  entity  gains  access  to  a  system  by  deceitfully 
representing a learner at the start, midway or for the duration of an assessment. Examples include illegally 
writing a test, unlawful external appearances. Impersonation is an attack on presence. 
b.  Duplication: this occurs when an unauthorised entity gains access to a system by misrepresenting the 
uniqueness of a learner. Examples include illegal use of a learner’s identity. Duplication is an attack on 
identity. 
c.  Fabrication: this occurs when an unauthorised entity creates counterfeit information to prove a learner’s 
uniqueness.  Examples  include  injection  of  false  details  into  the  system.  Fabrication  is  an  attack  on 
authenticity. 
d.  Corruption: this occurs when an authorised learner performs fraudulent actions on the system.  Examples 
include doubles submission of test answers. Corruption is an attack on electronic integrity. 
4 Analysis of E-assessment Security Requirements 
We propose that, presence (P), identity (I), authenticity (A) and electronic integrity (E) are the security 
requirements in a summative e-assessment system with respect to the learner (asset). However, in this paper, we 
assume that minimising the security threats affecting the P – I – A requirements may simultaneously minimise the 
security threats of the electronic integrity requirement. Thus, in this paper the presence, identity and authenticity requirements will be considered. Related work exists based on the electronic integrity security threats and measures 
(Marais et al, 2006; Apampa et al, 2008).   
In figure 1, the presence requirement poses the question ‘are you there?’ the identity requirement asks the 
question ‘who are you?’ and the authenticity requirement poses the question ‘is it really you?’ To describe the 
importance of the three requirements, we consider examples of online systems which employ only two of the three 
requirements.  
 
Figure 1 E-assessment security requirements  
 
4.1 Presence and Identity Requirements only   
In this system, the entity’s presence is of high importance and it excludes the need to prove that the identity 
belongs to the correct entity. In figure 2, the entity is required to produce a form of identity and be continually 
present at the location. Thus, these requirements may be suitable for online formative systems. For example, we 
assume that Alice decides to take an online practice test. She logs on to the website (virtual presence) and she is 
required to enter a username or email address for identification. The identity is required, such that the system can 
match a test to Alice for the duration of the test. This may be useful for personalised feedback or marks. Another 
useful system where the presence and identity requirements may be suitable is in an online gaming system. In most 
multiplayer games, prospective players are required to log on to the gaming website and adopt nick names for the 
duration of the game. However, this system may be unsuitable for high-stake summative assessment; because it 
encourages misrepresentation of identity. 
  
Figure 2 Presence and Identity requirements 
4.2 Presence and Authenticity Requirements only 
In this system, a proof is required to authenticate presence continually and it excludes the need for an entity 
to provide an identity. Based on literature survey, the authors of this paper are yet to find a system which relies on 
presence and authenticity requirements only.  Thus, we assume the sets do not intersect (figure 3). However, if such 
a system exists it may also be fallible to impersonation challenges. As an example, we assume that Alice and Eva 
are two friends enrolled in a system which requires presence and authenticity only. Irrespective of Alice’s method of 
proof, she may exchange her details with Eva. Therefore, Eva is required to virtually ‘show up’ and prove her 
presence by using Alice’s proof. 
 
Figure 3 Presence and Authenticity requirements 
4.3 Identity and Authenticity Requirements only 
In  this  system,  a  proof  is  required  to  confirm  the  identity  presented  by  an  entity.  Irrespective  of 
technologies, the primary aim of these systems is to provide evidence for the identity of an entity. The identity and 
authenticity  requirements  (see  figure  4)  are  widely  adopted  in  many  online  systems  including  existing  online 
summative environments (1). However, systems adopting the identity and authenticity requirements (excluding the 
presence requirement)  may be highly  susceptible to impersonation challenges.  In traditional tests, learners are 
usually expected to possess a learner number as a form of identity and a photo card to authenticate the identity. 
Using a similar approach, in online assessments learners are issued a username for identification and a password to 
authenticate the username. However, the technology is gradually fading due to impersonation challenges. In the light 
of this flaw, biometric technology has been suggested has a unique method for identity or authenticity.   
Figure 4 Identity and Authenticity requirements 
5 Implications of Employing Two Requirements 
From the intersections above, it is  noticed that  systems  which employ only two requirements in their 
security  framework  are  susceptible  to  impersonation  or  misrepresentation  threats  i.e.  {P∩ I,  P∩ A,  I∩ A}.  In 
addition, the existing summative e-assessment systems fall into the category of systems that require only Identity 
and Authenticity {I∩ A} requirements. Recall that, impersonation is an attack on the presence requirement. Thus, it 
is  assumed  that  the  exclusion  of  presence  verification  in  the  existing  summative  e-assessments  may  increase 
impersonation challenges in the system. In an existing summative security framework, a learner is required to be 
identified and authenticated before writing a test. Thus, it is unlikely that the system will continuously verify the 
learners’ presence for the duration of the test. To explain this situation, we assume two scenarios. 
Scenarios: 
a.  Alice and Eva are friends. Alice is present at the assessment site, correctly identified and authenticated to 
write a test. However, mid-way through the test she employs Eva to complete the test on her behalf. Thus, 
the system assumes that Alice’s details are still linked to the presence represented. 
b.  Alice and Eva are identical twins. Alice is absent at the assessment site; but employs her twin sister, Eva to 
write a test on her behalf.  Thus, the system is oblivious to the incorrect presence linked to the correct 
details represented. 
We observe that checking only the identity and authenticity requirements may be insufficient to write an online 
summative test. However, if the presence requirement of a learner is verified continuously; then it is unlikely that 
the identity and authenticity requirements of the learner will change for the duration of the test. It is noted here, that 
a continuous verification of the learners’ presence does not imply a continuous interruption of the learners’ presence. 
Ideally,  the  system  should  not  interrupt  a  learner’s  test  to  verify  continuous  presence;  but  it  is  important  that 




In this paper, we have defined the security requirements that are specific to online summative assessments. 
We observe that the existing confidentiality, integrity and availability (C-I-A) requirements may be insufficient to 
fulfil the needs of an e-assessment system. Thus, we propose that presence (P), identity (I) and authenticity (A) are 
the security requirements expected of a learner (critical asset) in a summative e-assessment system. If a critical asset 
is compromised; then it is perceived that the system as failed to satisfy all of its requirements. Hence, it is important 
that a learner is present, correctly identified and authenticated for the duration of an assessment. In addition, we 
observe that the existing online summative assessment system may be susceptible to impersonation threats (attack 
on presence requirement); due to employing two requirements i.e. identity and authenticity requirements only. Thus, 
we suggest that the exclusion of presence verification in summative e-assessments may increase impersonation 
threats in the system. Our current work focuses on developing a formal model of an online summative assessment 
system which will show the behaviour of the system when the presence of the learner is verified. References 
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